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CIVIL PROCEDURE – INDEPENDENT ACTION 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from a district court order dismissing an independent action to obtain relief from 
an otherwise unreviewable final judgment. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 An action to obtain relief from an otherwise unreviewable final judgment will only lie 
when needed to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice. In determining whether an appellant 
meets this standard, the Court will consider the utilization of available avenues for legal relief. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
This case was the second of two lawsuits brought by Appellant, Francie Bonnell, against 
her daughter and son-in-law, Respondents. The first lawsuit ended in summary judgment against 
Appellant and she appealed, seeking to undo the summary judgment and its award of attorney’s 
fees. 
 
The source of the dispute was Appellant’s $135,000 payment (“payment”) toward the 
mortgage on her daughter’s home (referred to as “the Lindell premises”). In return for the 
payment, Appellant expected a life estate in the Lindell premises. Respondents acknowledged 
the payment, but claimed it was a loan that was repaid when Respondents deeded Appellant a 
different home (“the Arbor premises”) with equity exceeding the amount of the payment. None 
of the terms were put in writing. 
 
Appellant’s first suit asserted several legal and equitable claims and was premised on her 
claimed life estate. After 14 months of litigation, Appellant’s lawyer withdrew and Appellant 
proceeded pro per. Respondents then moved for summary judgment. Appellant received the 
motion but did not oppose it. Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment and 
determined Appellant’s claims were “meritless” and that the statute of frauds defeated the life 
estate claim.
2
 Following summary judgment, Respondents recovered their attorney’s fees and 
costs. Appellant did not move for reconsideration or relief from judgment. 
 
Over a year later, Appellant, with new counsel, filed a second suit in the same district that 
alleged the same claims as the first action. The case was assigned to a different judge than the 
first suit. Appellant alleged that she was able to proceed by independent action under Rule 60(b) 
because she was representing herself and Respondent’s exploited her unrepresented status. 
Respondent’s moved to dismiss the second claim under res judicata3 and expiration of the six-
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month period for relief from judgment.
4
 The district court rejected Appellant’s argument and 
dismissed this second suit with prejudice. Appellant timely appealed. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Justice Pickering wrote for the unanimous three justice panel,
5
 noting that “[r]esort to an 
independent action may be had only rarely, and then only under unusual and exceptional 
circumstances.”6 Furthermore, to obtain relief by independent action, a claimant must meet 
traditional requirements that are more exacting than required for relief by motion under NRCP 
60(b)(1)-(3). NRCP 60(b) permits relief from judgment by motion of by independent action. 
Addressing motions, the rule specifies both the permissible grounds and the time deadlines that 
apply.  However, the rule does not name any such specifics in reference to relief by independent 
action.  The Court adds to the standard by citing a Supreme Court holding that “under the Rule, 
an independent action [is] available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.”7 
 
 Because NRCP 60(b)’s text makes its time deadlines applicable only to motions, not 
independent actions, Appellant argued that she could proceed by independent action to set aside 
the summary judgment and associate fee award, despite her delay.  In essence, Appellant argued 
that a litigant seeking relief from a final judgment but allowed the time for doing so by motion 
under NRCP 60(b)(1) – (3) expire, could do so by independent action, as lon as she alleged facts 
that might qualify for motion based relief under NRCP 60(b)(1)-(3).  The Court disagreed. 
 
 The Court first reviewed the dismissal order under the standards for summary judgment 
because both Appellant’s new complaint and Respondents’ motion to dismiss included excerpts 
from the first case.
8
 As to the standard of review, because the second action was brought before a 
new judge who determined its viability as a matter of law, the Court determined that de novo 
review applied. The Court then asserted that “the bar against relitigation of already-decided 
issues is, in essence, ‘an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation’ and 
‘should be resolved at the earliest possible stage in litigation.’”9   
 
 The Court went on to consider the comprehensive review of Rule 60(b) in U.S. v. 
Braggerly.
10
 The Court highlighted the fact that the new rule abolished nearly all forms of post-
judgment review, leaving only independent action for relief from judgment. Accordingly, 
independent action is to be reserved for those cases that violate justice to such an extent that a 
court must depart from following the doctrine of res judicata. 
 
 Appellant claimed that Respondents committed misconduct that resulted in legal error by 
the district judge in the first suit. Appellant also claimed that she did not receive proper notice of 
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the motion for summary judgment in the first suit. The Court determined that these claims did 
not meet the standard of a “grave miscarriage of justice.”  
 
 Furthermore, the Court pointed out that Appellant neglected several legal remedies 
available to her, namely moving for a new trial, timely appeal, or moving for relief from 
judgment. The Court notes that Appellant’s argument that she has a partial performance defense 
against the statue of frauds would have been appropriate had it been timely filed within these 
avenues and that independent action was not an appropriate legal vehicle in this situation. 
 
 Finally, the Court determined that Appellant incorrectly interpreted two other 
independent action cases decided by the Court
11
 and Appellant’s argument that independent 
action was available regardless of the grounds asserted was invalid. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court concluded that neither Appellant’s arguments nor the record indicated the 
threat of a grave miscarriage of justice that is required to sustain an independent action for relief. 
Furthermore, the Court found that all other appropriate avenues for legal relief were bypassed 
and the sought independent action was untimely. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial 
court’s dismissal of the suit. 
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